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Conversion to Protestant Christianity in China and the ‘Supply-side Model’: 
Explaining Changes in the Chinese Religious Field 
 
Thoralf Klein 
 
Abstract. In this article, I put the ‘supply-side model’ advocated by religious economists to an 
empirical test. The ‘supply-side’ model in some measure already constitutes a move ‘beyond the 
market’, as it seeks to expand and enlarge the economic interpretation of religion by linking it to a 
concept of networks and social tensions and integrating the concept of religious and cultural 
capital. In applying the model to the (dynamics of the) historical growth of Protestantism in 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century China, I examine three distinct aspects of the conversion 
process: the supply-side (missionaries), the demand niches (Chinese converts) and the question of 
‘strict’ churches. Arguing that the religious background of Protestant converts – their rootedness 
in Chinese popular religion – determined this process through, I seek to develop an 
understanding of religious competition, supply and demand that takes cultural interpretive 
frameworks into account. 
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One of the central aspects of the religious economy approach is its explanation of religious 
change. Such change is understood as a shift in the ensemble of religious activities in a society, 
referred to within this theoretical framework as a religious economy. In their co-authored book 
Acts of Faith (2000: 194), Rodney Stark and Roger Finke – two of the main proponents of 
economic approach to religion – have made a sweeping statement, arguing that “when exclusive 
firms appear in religious economies previously dominated by non-exclusive groups, the exclusive 
firm(s) become dominant.” Stark and Finke cite the rise of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as 
historical evidence of how exclusive competitors came to dominate “a relatively unregulated 
market” because each was “the better bargain, despite requiring higher costs” (ibid.). These 
examples, which can be given with the benefit of hindsight, are complemented by contemporary 
ones from East Asia, which stand on somewhat shakier ground: the expansion of Sōka Gakkai, 
an exclusivist lay Buddhist association, in Japan from less than 6,000 households in 1951 to 
around eight million in 1995, and the conversion of students in 1980s Singapore from Buddhism 
or Chinese popular religion to either Christianity or Islam (ibid.). For one thing, these are still 
ongoing processes, and for another, in neither case can the exclusive groups be said to have 
achieved a dominant status. Further testing of the hypothesis is therefore required. 
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The argument that exclusive religious groups win out over non-exclusive ones must be viewed 
against the backdrop of the ‘supply-side model’ developed by the religious economists. The gist 
of the argument is that changes in a religious economy are induced not by alterations in religious 
demand – the conventional explanation of religious change –, but by the appearance of new 
religious competitors and hence by shifts in religious supply. Although this model has been tested 
empirically (e. g. Bruce 2000, Jagodzinski and Greeley, no date, Greeley 1998), such tests have 
been limited to Western Europe and the USA. To the extent that the supply-side model aspires 
to be universally applicable, other world regions need to be taken into account. 
In what follows, I will test the supply-side model by taking a look at the history of conversions 
to Protestant Christianity in China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In so doing, I 
will provide an example of how – to paraphrase Stark and Finke – an exclusive religion 
performed in a largely unregulated context. The focus of this paper will be on the period when 
evangelization was dominated by foreign missionaries, but developments in the post-missionary 
era after 1949 will provide a point of comparison, as will movements at the fringes of 
Christianity, such as the Taiping religion. 
In confronting the supply-side model with what empirical evidence on the history of 
Protestant Christianity in China has been assembled over the past few decades, I wish to engage 
the existing research context in various ways. First, as should have become clear, I intend to 
proceed from the phenomenon for which the religious economy approach was originally 
conceived – Christianity in North America and Europe – by placing it in a different context, 
namely the Chinese religious field. Second, I try to avoid an a priori critique of the religious 
economy approach, as many of its opponents have done (e.g. Bruce 2008, Voas, Olson and 
Crockett 2002, Bryant 2000). I consider such a critique difficult as many of the theoretical 
assumptions of the religious economy approach are axiomatic in nature and hence impossible to 
falsify. Whether it is possible to subsume spiritual experience under the category of ‘reward’ or 
‘utility’ is not a matter of verifiability. Neither am I predisposed against the way the religious 
economy model seemingly glosses over core values of religion such as devotion, zeal, self-
sacrifice and compassion on the basis of theoretical assumptions otherwise associated with 
material gains.1 What I am interested in is the explanatory value of the ‘supply-side model’. 
Third, I wish to move away from previous applications of the religious economy model to a 
Chinese context, not only in that unlike their authors, I do not regard this model a priori as an 
accepted one, but also in abandoning their focus on contemporary issues. Not coincidentally, 
perhaps, the majority of existing studies (Lang, Chan and Ragvald 2005, Lu Yunfeng 2005 and 
                                                 
1  I am drawing here on discussions at the two conferences mentioned in the introduction to this volume, as well as 
on the comments of an anonymous reviewer on an earlier version of this paper. 
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2008, Yang Fenggang 2006, Yang and Tamney 2005) deal with the reform period after 1978 
when China was being transformed into a ‘socialist market economy’. By contrast, I attempt to 
shift attention to the late Imperial and early Republican periods, providing a historical dimension 
that only a minority of studies has explored (McCleary and van der Kuijp 2010, Seiwert 2003). 
In particular, this paper addresses the following questions: To what extent can the religious 
economy model explain the early history of Protestantism in China in general? In particular, can 
the supply-side model explain conversions to Protestant Christianity and does the history of 
Chinese Protestantism bear out the hypothesis about the greater competitiveness of exclusive 
religions? Is there a necessity to move ‘beyond the market’ with regard to China, and if so, what 
could this move look like? To be able to answer this question, it is important that we look at the 
basic assumptions of the ‘supply-side model’ in the first place. Since it is probably less well 
known than the basic assumptions of the religious economy model in general, it merits a brief 
discussion. 
 
 
Applying the supply-side model to the study of Protestant Christianity in China 
 
Published in 2000, Acts of Faith, co-authored by Stark and Finke, is the synthesis and 
culmination point of at least a decade of research by the two authors, their long-time associate, 
Laurence Iannaccone, and others (e. g. Stark 2003, Finke 1998, Stark and Iannaccone 1994, Finke 
and Iannaccone 1993). It provides a general theory of religious economies in the form of the 
‘supply-side interpretation’, which can be viewed as the result of a certain terminological and 
conceptual shift in the 1990s that constitutes a partial move ‘beyond the market’ as the economic 
foundations are expanded and enriched with social and cultural concepts (cf. Stark and Finke 
2000: 194). Although the ‘supply-side model’ is formulated with explicit neglect of “[religious] 
economies consisting of nonexclusive firms” (ibid.) – in other words, most polytheistic societies 
–, Stark and Finke make it clear in other sections of their book that they consider their model to 
be universally applicable. Therefore I assume that the basic concepts of the ‘supply-side 
interpretation’ can be legitimately tested with regard to China as well. 
According to the ‘supply-side model’, overall religious demand is relatively stable, with the 
religious economy divided into market niches comprising people with similar religious interests 
and preferences. These niches are held together less by social status than by the effect of 
common socialization (Stark and Finke: 197-198). Religious change is not viewed as the result of 
a changing demand structure, but rather as a consequence of transformations on the supply side 
as religious groups begin to occupy additional or different niches (Stark and Finke 2000: 193-
 4 
196). These shifts, in turn, can be attributed to two fundamental assumptions of the religious 
economists, which were developed in their earlier works: First, religious groups operate like 
firms, i.e. they market their religious “brands”, seeking to maximize their gains in terms of 
members and funds and thus competing with one another on a religious market (Iannaccone 
1998: 1484-1485; Finke 1998). Second, according to the fundamental axiom of the religious 
economy model, human beings “seek what they perceive to be rewards and try to avoid what 
they perceive to be costs” (Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 5; cf. also Stark and Finke 2000: 100). 
Thus religious actors will look for rewards, both this-worldly and otherworldly ones, on the basis 
of a ‘rational’ analysis of costs and benefits (Stark and Finke 2000: 51-52, 88-89).2 This means 
that they compare the amount of “material, social and psychic costs of belonging to a religious 
group” (ibid.: 144). People do not necessarily prefer the ‘cheapest’ alternative, but are willing to 
pay higher prices for commensurate returns. In particular, two sets of costs are of interest: The 
first arises from the relationship with one or several gods, defined as patterns of exchange. An 
exclusive exchange relationship with one god tends to be more extensive and demanding, on the 
other hands, it offers more valuable (and other-worldly) rewards, in particular life after death (and 
not only a next life) (ibid.: 97-100). Stark and Finke follow Durkheim (1915: 42-50) in 
distinguishing between religion and magic. Departing from (and somewhat simplifying) 
Durkheim’s distinction, they define the former as the relationship between humans and gods, the 
latter as the manipulation of supernatural forces without reference to (a) god(s) or to general 
explanations. This is also important because magic can neither generate extended patterns of 
exchange nor lead to forming a religious organization, being provided to individual clients instead 
(Stark and Finke 2000: 104-106). The second set of costs arises from the level of tensions 
between religious groups and the rest of society, which I am going to discuss in more detail 
shortly. 
It is against this backdrop that conversions take place. Conversions are defined by Finke and 
Stark as “shifts across religious traditions” (Stark and Finke 2000: 114), a definition that I adopt 
for the purpose of this article. They are conceptually opposed to reaffiliations, which by 
definition take place between different strands of the same religious tradition (ibid.). Of the two 
processes, reaffiliation is the easier and hence more frequent one, since it allows people to bring 
in much of their acquired religious capital – their knowledge and mastery of a particular religious 
culture – into their new affiliation (ibid.: 120-124). In the process of conversion, Stark and Finke 
                                                 
2  It is interesting to observe that the term ‘compensator’, defined as “a belief that a reward will be obtained in the 
distant future or in some other context which cannot immediately verified” (Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 6, cf. id. 
1979), has disappeared from the religious economic vocabulary in ‘Acts of Faith’, possibly because of its 
pejorative overtones. Note, however, that the concept of put-off rewards itself has been retained (Finke and 
Stark 2000: 88). By the same token, ‘utility’, another important term in earlier works (cf. Iannaccone 1998: 1479) 
is also conspicuously absent in the more recent book. It is important to note, also, that Stark and Finke (2000: 
41) have rejected the label of ‘Rational Choice Theorists’. 
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(as well as Stark in his earlier, single-authored work on Christianity) have highlighted the 
importance of networks. This means that individuals’ choice of religions is not an isolated 
process, but is informed by what people in their social environment (such as friends, neighbours, 
or spouses) choose (ibid.: 116-118, 125-138). The notion that religious niches are to some extent 
based on common class status, but more commonly on shared (patterns of) socialization, links 
the idea of conversion through networking to that of a religious market composed of demand 
niches. 
Against this background, the ‘supply-side model’ goes on to argue that the relationship 
between religious groups and society at large is a crucial factor in religious change. New religious 
groups usually emerge as ‘sects’3 characterized by a high tension with society, as both recruiting 
and monitoring are easier for small organizations (Stark and Finke 2000: 205 ff.). This tension 
arises from a religious group’s strictness, i. e. its maintenance of a distinctive lifestyle and morality 
in both religious matters and everyday life (Iannaccone 1994: 1190). By applying “penalties and 
prohibition”, groups may increase their members’ commitment – which Stark and Finke define 
as the degree of meeting exchange obligations towards a god as defined by a given religious 
organization – as well as rates of participation and eventual net benefits for their members (ibid.: 
1187, 1183, cf. Stark and Finke 2000: 103). This is possible because their high standards exclude 
or deter all those ‘free riders’ who want to enjoy the benefits of religious goods without 
contributing to their production gives them an edge over their competitors. To ensure growth 
and hence to be successful, religious groups must find the appropriate level of tension – “strict, 
but not too strict”, as Rodney Stark (2003: 262) has formulated. On the one hand, they need an 
effective and legitimate authority capable of enforcing decisions that are accepted by the 
members; on the other, the more they maintain a cultural continuity with pre-existing religious 
traditions – also defined as cultural capital as opposed to religious capital –, the more successful 
they will be (ibid.: 261-262, 264-265).4 Accordingly, high-tension groups lowering tensions to a 
medium level are able to occupy larger niches and expand their membership (although they will 
cease to do so if tensions are reduced further); at the same time, their growth will lead to tensions 
and schisms (Stark and Finke 2000: 205-207, cf. Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 19-25). 
                                                 
3  Thus another important distinction, that between cult and sect, has also disappeared. Both were understood as 
deviant religious communities; however, cults, were thought to be situated “outside the conventional religious 
tradition(s) of a society” (Stark and Bainbridge 1997: 104; cf. also Stark and Bainbridge 1979 and 1985: 24-26, 
Stark 2003: 261-262, which latter was originally published in 1996), while sects exist within these traditions. In 
terms of China, Protestant Christianity in the early nineteenth century would have constituted a cult, as would 
Buddhism at the time of its first appearance more than a thousand years earlier. 
4  The distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ seems to be meaningful here, wherefore I have added the 
emphasis. The alternative term of ‘cultural capital’ (Stark 2003: 261) seems to suggest a loose cultural framework 
rather than the transfer of knowledge and mastery of a religion as suggested in Acts of Faith. 
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In the following, I will apply this conceptual framework to the study of Protestant Christianity 
in nineteenth and twentieth-century China. For centuries, Chinese religions have been 
characterized by fluidity and overlaps rather than clear-cut boundaries. And although some 
Chinese religions (such as monastic Daoism and Buddhism) can be viewed as institutionalized, 
they have become enmeshed in the web of what C.K. Yang (1961) has called “diffused religion” 
and what is generally referred to as popular religion. In Chinese popular religion, religious 
activities are carried out by the basic social institutions such as family, village or descent group or 
by individuals within the framework of these institutions. At the same time, the relative 
vagueness of inter-religious boundaries in China has led to exchange, appropriation and fusion, 
be it in new forms of syncretistic religion (Berling 1980), the idea of the unity of the Three 
Teachings of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism (Gentz 2006) or the eclectic borrowing from 
a wide array of traditions in Chinese popular religion (Brook 1993).  
In late Imperial China, the government banned ‘heterodox’ (xie 邪 ) religions, and its 
Republican, Nationalist and Communist successors since the Revolution of 1911 pursued an 
even more interventionist religious policy (Liu Kwang-ching 1990, Liu and Shek 2004, Duara 
1991, Gossaert 2006, Nedostup 2010, Wang Xiaoming 2003, Luo Zhufeng 1991, Potter 2003). 
But with the possible exception of the early People’s Republic between 1949 and 1976, much of 
religious policy was utilitarian, and even when the government favoured one particular religion – 
as was the case with Confucianism in Imperial China –, others were tolerated, so there was always 
a remarkable degree of religious pluralism. As will be shown in more detail below, the Qing 
dynasty (1644-1911) had outlawed Christianity (in its Catholic form) in 1724, which effectively 
barred Protestants from entering China. But after Protestantism, along with Catholicism, had 
become a lawful competitor in the mid-nineteenth century, missionaries were at least formally 
free to evangelize at will. 
The structure of this paper will follow the theoretical outline given above. As befits a 
discussion of the ‘supply-side model’, I begin with a discussion of the ‘suppliers’, i.e. the 
missionaries and the organizations that sent them to China, looking in particular at the ways in 
which they recruited converts and at the institutional arrangements they set up. In a second step, 
I shift the perspective to the ‘demand side’, analyzing the patterns underlying Chinese 
conversions. The third section looks at Christian congregations in China as ‘strict churches’ and 
examines both the attempts of the missionaries to subject the Chinese Christians to a rigid 
church discipline and the ways the latter sought to deal with the exigencies of Christianity. Much 
of the empirical material is drawn from my research on the Basel Mission and its Hakka Church 
in Southern China, which is fairly representative of a rural Chinese church founded by pietist or 
evangelical missionaries; however, I have supplemented this material with other contemporary 
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missionary publications, statistical material and findings from other studies in order to gain the 
broadest possible perspective. In the concluding paragraphs, I will return to the theoretical issues 
and discuss the value of the ‘supply-side model’ for explaining conversions to Christianity in late 
Imperial and early Republican China. 
 
 
The missionary framework for conversions 
 
Any discussion of the history of Protestant Christianity in China must begin with the political 
framework which enabled it to ‘supply’ the Chinese with a largely (though not wholly) new form 
of religion. Unlike the Catholics, early nineteenth-century Protestant missionaries were absolute 
newcomers to China. But the ban on Catholicism issued and enforced by successive emperors of 
the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) in the eighteenth century as a consequence of their conflicts with 
the Vatican applied to Protestants as well, so they were not free to reside within the borders of 
the Qing empire, let alone evangelize there (Su Jing 2005: 11-12). It was therefore only after the 
‘unequal treaties’ and toleration edicts of the 1840s to 1860s, which the ‘Western’ powers had 
forced on the Qing empire, had legalized the residence and evangelizing activities of ‘Western’ 
missionaries in China that missionaries could establish themselves in the interior of China. By 
1900, there was hardly a district without at least a handful of mission stations (Feuerwerker 1976: 
39). The missionaries’ right of abode was complemented by several toleration edicts, likewise 
wrested from the Qing government, which exempted Chinese Christians from contributions to 
‘heathen’ rituals (Tiedemann 1996: 389). Within this new legal framework, Christian missions 
could lawfully compete with other religions, and what is more, it could do so on its own terms. 
Without any political or legal need for compromise with any form of Chinese religion, the 
approach of nineteenth-century missionaries had little in common with the strategy of 
accommodation developed by the early modern Jesuits – although even this strategy was perhaps 
less compromise-oriented than has long been assumed (Brockey 2008, Standaert 2001, Gernet 
1985). 
And competition did lie at the heart of the Protestant mission enterprise in China as 
elsewhere. Evangelization was tantamount to convincing the Chinese of the superiority of 
Christianity over all indigenous forms of religion. This attitude reflected the dichotomic 
worldview of most missionaries, who perceived ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘light’ and ‘darkness’, God and 
Satan as being locked in a permanent struggle – although it was clear to them that the ultimate 
victory belonged to God and his children. In addressing Chinese people, missionaries strove to 
convince them that they were sinners in need of salvation, that Jesus Christ had redeemed them 
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to the grace of God and that they were to believe in him and accept his sacrifice to be saved from 
damnation. This was the missionaries’ message put in a nutshell; to transmit it to their audiences, 
they relied on a number of techniques, some of which were direct and others indirect. Dominant 
in the former category was (often itinerant) preaching, which was based on the assumption that 
the truth of the Christian message was plainly intelligible to human reason; moreover, there 
existed a ‘natural theology’ that, unbeknownst to themselves, the missionaries’ listeners also were 
familiar with (Klein 2002: 166-169). Preaching could take place in more formal or rather informal 
settings. A rather casual strategy employed by female missionaries on house-to-house visits 
(because Chinese women did not usually appear in public) was called ‘gossiping the gospel’ 
(Austin 2007: 4-5), but male missionaries held similar meetings with Chinese men at their mission 
stations. Visual material was employed to support the verbal message, but was also put on display 
independently so as to arouse the interest of passers-by and to attract them to the Christian 
message (Klein 2002: 166-167). The China Inland Mission and the Church Missionary Society, 
two of the largest organizations, adopted a device called the ‘Wordless Book’, which consisted in 
four pages of plain colours to explain God’s plan of salvation, and which inadvertently played 
upon the Chinese symbolism of colours evident in the cosmological cycle of the Five Elements 
(wu xing 五行), where every element and developmental phase is associated with one specific 
colour (Austin 2007: 2-11, 86-90). 
Such techniques partly helped the missionaries in circumventing the obvious linguistic 
problems they were facing. Since missionaries arriving in China took time to acquire the linguistic 
skills necessary to preach and converse effectively and only a minority of them came close to 
Chinese standards, practically all mission societies resorted to employing Chinese assistants, who 
played an invaluable role in spreading Christianity (Lutz and Lutz 1995). A related problem that 
was more difficult to remedy (and also required Chinese assistance) was that of creating a 
Christian language and terminology that would appeal to the Chinese without compromising the 
theological concepts espoused by the missionaries. This was evident in oral communication, but 
even more in the translation of the Bible into Chinese. Controversies over the appropriate name 
for God or the problems surrounding the translation of the word ‘sin’ – a concept hitherto 
unknown in China – are the most prominent examples, but are only indicative of a broader trend 
(Zetzsche 1999, cf. Eber 1999, Li Tiyuan 1995). 
Linguistic intricacies certainly did not deter the missionaries, but probably contributed to the 
development of more indirect strategies, in particular medical mission and education. Both had 
their roots in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Many missionaries offered medical 
treatment, but over time the service became more professionalized, with trained physicians taking 
over and establishing hospitals. They provided health care for their fellow missionaries, but more 
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importantly spread ‘Western’ healing methods throughout China, offering effective treatment and 
helping to train a modern Chinese medical elite (Cohen 1978: 574-576, Minden 1994, cf. Yip 
1995: 19-22). In addition to being cured of physical illness, patients were regularly addressed or 
preached to by missionaries or Chinese evangelists. Education was even more intimately 
connected with the effort to spread the Gospel, as the missionaries hoped it would shatter what 
they considered one of the bedrocks of paganism – ignorance (e. g. Lechler 1877:162). At a more 
pragmatic level, mission schools and universities became training institutions for Chinese 
assistants and theologians, in other words for the future leadership of the church. Once the 
Chinese state had removed the barriers for the full recognition of mission-school education in 
the early twentieth century, the massive influx of more secular-minded students made it difficult 
for mission schools to maintain their Christian character, especially in higher education 
(Rosenbaum 2006: 28-29, 42-44; cf. Wang Dong 2007: 39-42). 
Protestant missions thus made use of a wide array of strategies and techniques attractive to the 
Chinese, and in so doing, were driven by a sense of competition with indigenous forms of 
religion. However, this did not mean that people who were attracted to Christianity through these 
efforts were easily admitted into the congregations established by the various mission societies. 
On the contrary, missionaries insisted that converts receive instruction in the basic principles of 
Christianity. This usually meant that they had to be able to memorize a number of essential texts 
such as the Lord’s Prayer, the Ten Commandments and the Apostles’ Creed, after which they 
were admitted to baptism. It was crucial for the missionaries to reserve the right to baptize for 
themselves (Cheung 2004: 64-82). With the exception of a few outsiders such as the German free 
missionary Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (1803-1851) with his strategy of blitz conversion, most 
‘Western’ missionaries were going for quality rather than quantity, concentrating on a “selected 
few” (Cheung 2004: 83, 86; cf. Lutz 2008: 227-228, 247-249). 
From the missionary viewpoint, baptism constituted a rite de passage in two ways: It marked a 
clean break with the converts’ pasts, both in terms of religious affiliations and socio-cultural 
habits, and it initiated them into a new type of religious community, the Christian congregation. 
With few exceptions, such as the above-mentioned Gützlaff and the China Inland Mission prior 
to 1900 (Lutz 2008: 220-228, Austin 2007: 440-443), the majority of missionaries seem to have 
favoured a process that mirrored their own socialization into Christianity in the ‘West’: In the 
tradition of evangelicalism, pietism and revivalism, conversions were expected to individual 
processes of inward spiritual transformation, although even most missionaries had hardly 
experienced a dramatic and sweeping revolution in their religious biographies as postulated in 
revivalist rhetoric (cf. Altena 2003, Jenkins 1978). At any rate, conversions of Chinese needed a 
social framework, and congregations were a quasi ‘natural’ way to provide the latter.  
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Most missionaries were sufficiently realistic so as to distinguish between the formal act of 
joining the Christian church on the one hand and true spiritual rebirth on the other. Hence they 
perceived congregations as a form of organization that contributed significantly to inculcating in 
the indigenous converts a Christian way of life that comprised changes not only of their external 
behaviour, but also of their spiritual development. Congregations thus also provided an 
institutional framework for monitoring Christians and to make sure that they did not stray from 
the right path. This was considered all the more necessary as the Christians formed a tiny 
minority in an otherwise ‘heathen’ society, a point which I will explore in more detail in the third 
section. Christian congregations were not set up independently, however, but they were 
incorporated into the organizational framework of the respective mission societies.  
Most mission societies also set up more or less formalized guidelines to direct their converts’ 
religious lives. Clearly written rules might not necessarily advance the Christians’ spiritual 
development, but they might instil in them the mores and behaviour expected of a true Christian 
or at least prevent them from relapses into paganism. Regulations did not prescribe social 
segregation, but exhorted Christians to abstain from any ‘heathen’ practices, in particular religious 
practices. Thus the Chinese translation of the charter drawn up by the Swiss-German Basel 
Mission carefully listed the religious practices forbidden for a Christian: 
“If there are those who inquire after baptism to enter the mission and have to do with the 
affairs of evil gods, they must do away with them, no matter whether openly or secretly, they 
must not engage in them. […] Those who have been baptized into Christ’s death or wish to be 
baptized may not perform the jiao 醮 [a Daoist purification ritual, T.K.] nor keep the holidays for 
graves and ancestors (shoujie shanfen, zugong 守節山墳､祖公). All techniques to ward off evil 
influences are doings of the heathen (yibangren 異邦人). It is not proper for members of the 
mission (shenghuiren 聖會人) to use them, therefore they ought to be abolished. Eight Trigram 
divination (bugua 卜卦 ), fortune telling, geomancy and chronomancy (dili zeri 地理擇日 ), 
questioning the immortals, contacting a medium, exorcising demons and writing charms are all 
dark deeds, the children of God may not emulate [those who perform them]” (Base Shenghui 
Guitiao 1874, 1-3, translated by T.K.). 
This list indicates how Protestant missions such as the Basel mission were strict societies in 
the sense of the supply-side model in that they adopted an uncompromising attitude towards all 
forms of local Chinese religion. For Christians, this entailed a clean break not only with their 
former religious life, but, more importantly, with the ongoing religious activities of their kin and 
neighbours. There was some debate to what extent missions ought to interfere with practices that 
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were not religious; however, there seems to have been a widespread consensus that missions 
should work towards abolishing not only “idolatrous” customs, but also practices that were not 
religious in nature, but “cruel” or “vicious” or at least leading to vice. These included polygamy 
and child marriage, infanticide, gambling and feuding (Ohlinger 1890, 605-608; Noyes 1890, 610). 
To fully appreciate the magnitude of this task that the missionaries had set for themselves, we 
must first understand what brought Chinese people to the Christian church. 
 
 
Conversion to Christianity from a Chinese Perspective 
 
I will begin my discussion of conversions to Christianity in late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century China by looking at the statistics, which the various mission societies (both Protestants 
and Catholics) were meticulous in keeping. In the late 1870s, there was a total of about 13,000 
Protestant Christians in China (Records of the General Conference 1878: 486). The great 
statistical survey undertaken by the China Continuation Committee – an interdenominational and 
mixed ‘Western’-Chinese organization founded in 1910 (Latourette 1929: 671) – yielded about 
235,000 communicants for 1914 and a figure of 366,000 communicants only in 1920, although it 
generously placed the total Christian constituency at almost twice that number – including those 
“under Christian instruction” – and pointed out that the number of Christians had more than 
tripled since 1900 (Stauffer 1922: 38, 293). With the Chinese population estimated at more than 
452 million in the same publication, only one in around 1,300 Chinese was a Protestant Christian 
(ibid.: 298). A sidelong glance at the Catholics yields a comparable trend (cf. Streit 1906: 10-11). 
Eighty years after the first unequal treaties, Christianity was still very much a minority religion, 
with most Christians living in the countryside (Tiedemann 2001: 110).5 
That the overwhelming majority of the Chinese saw no reason to convert to Christianity begs 
the question, of course, why a minority did. For a long time, researchers have focused on the 
Christians’ economic and socio-political motives (e.g. Esherick 1987: 77-78), and in so doing they 
have been echoing an anti-Christian tradition in China that dates back to at least the 1920s (for a 
wider context cf. Stanley 1990: 11-30). Only more recently have anthropologists and historians 
begun to appreciate the religious motives behind conversions to Christianity (Jordan 1993, 
Dunch 2001, Tiedemann 2001, Klein 2002). This should not blindfold us against the secular 
dimension of converting to Christianity, as will become clear in the subsequent discussion, but it 
clearly has led to a more comprehensive and differentiated understanding of this process. The 
bulk of material comes from the missionary side. Missionaries had a vested interest in recording 
                                                 
5  It is for this reason that my analysis largely excludes the urban, often more liberal, sector of Protestantism. 
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and publishing conversion stories, since they legitimized and justified their efforts, allowing them 
to portray ‘model’ Christians and stimulating fund-raising. Their accounts of conversions and the 
motives underlying them thus have to be treated with the necessary cautions. 
Let us turn to the religious dimension first. This has to be examined against the background of 
the complex set of religious concepts and practices conventionally subsumed under the label 
popular religion or folk religion. A detailed examination would go far beyond the scope of this 
article. Suffice it to say that historically, Chinese popular religion has encompassed the 
relationship between humans and different kinds of transcendent beings – “gods, ghosts, and 
ancestors” (Jordan 1972, Wolf 1978) – as well as techniques to ward of evil influences, a number 
of which are listed in the above quotation from Base shenghui guitiao. Religious activities have been 
performed in various social frameworks: at the communal – i.e. villages, village alliances and 
descent groups –, family and individual levels. They also have been conducted at various places 
such as homes, temples, ancestral halls and graves. 
This complex whole might in part – though, I think, not in its entirety – be described as a 
‘religious gift economy’ that involved not only dyadic relationships, but also more indirect chains 
of exchange (cf. Palmer, this volume). To the extent that the former was the case, we may follow 
Jordan Paper (1995: 47-50 and 1987) in identifying sacrificial rituals in which – to put it simply – 
offerings were exchanged in return for protection as the core of Chinese popular religion. Key to 
this reciprocal exchange has been the concept of efficacy (ling 靈) or, more precisely, that of 
miraculous responses (lingying 靈應) to worshipers’ requests (Chau 2006: 2; cf. Brook 1993). The 
degree of flexibility this framework allowed depended on the way the relationship with gods, 
ancestors and ghosts was perceived. Ghosts were treated as generically evil (and therefore 
summarily ‘bribed’ for doing no harm rather than supplicated for positive protection), ancestors 
as generally good, while gods were thought of as more powerful, but also as less dependable than 
ancestors (Lagerwey 2000: 5-6). This latter relationship was therefore the most flexible, allowing 
for shifting allegiance to one or more powerful and efficacious deities and even for sanctions if 
divine protection was not forthcoming. Activities such as exposing the statues of deities to 
sunshine and heat or of ‘lashing the dragon pond’ (da longtan 打龍潭) in order to disturb the 
Dragon King of the Sea (hailongwang 海龍王), a deity specifically associated with providing rain, 
as measures of coping with droughts have been recorded by both missionaries and 
anthropologists in different regions of China (Smith 1899: 172, Stenz 1906: 863; Chen Jiasheng 
1997: 440). Given the volatile relationship with the gods, it comes as no surprise that in general, 
missionaries considered ancestor worship the greater obstacle to Christianization (cf. Yates 1878: 
5, 45). 
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The same focus on efficacy with which the gods have been treated has also guided the 
selecting and hiring of specialists providing various techniques of warding off evil and mobilizing 
positive influences, such as fengshui 風水 or various forms of divination (subsumed under ‘magic’ 
in the religious economy model as shown above). It almost goes without saying that this too has 
been a highly flexible (and competitive) process that allowed clients to go for whatever they have 
perceived as the best quality (e.g. Goossaert 2007: 240-263, Bruun 2003: 5-6, Fan Wei 1992, 
Hayes 1985). It has also allowed a procedure of trial and error to find the appropriate method 
(for an example cf. Lutz and Lutz 1998: 90). 
To efficacy, reciprocity and flexibility (as well as competition), we must add a last defining 
feature of Chinese popular religion: Although it addresses the relationship between the living and 
the dead, it has been primarily concerned with this-worldly as opposed to other-worldly rewards.6 
Both gods and ancestors and religious specialists have been approached for matters of health, 
offspring, rain – crucial in the largely agricultural society that was China at least up until the close 
of the twentieth century – success in business or the state examinations (as the main path to 
social advancement in late Imperial China), assistance in difficult decision-making, and the like. 
This was the background against which, if we are to believe the conversion stories recorded by 
missionaries, many Chinese were attracted to the Christian message. Personal hardships and 
crises often triggered this process: The death of close relatives, impoverishment and other 
mishaps caused people to search for the causes of their misfortunes and to look for the 
appropriate remedy. If help was not forthcoming from the established sources – gods, ancestors 
or religious specialists –, people might take a chance with the Christian god. If the latter proved 
to be effective in bringing about a change of fortune (Jordan 1993: 293), they might cast their lot 
with him (Klein 2002: 194-197; Najarian 1982: 83-85). In this context, effective treatment of 
diseases by missionaries provided a powerful incentive to become a Christian. 
‘Seekers after truth’, as the missionaries called those who inquired after the Christian message 
(Tiedemann 2001: 116-117), also came from a very different quarter of the Chinese religious 
field, namely from lay groups often referred to as popular religious ‘sects’ (for problems of 
terminology cf. ter Haar 1992: 11-15). Like the Christians, these groups relied on sacred texts 
(baojuan 寶卷), some of which reflect the Buddhist concern of how to free oneself from the cycle 
of rebirth (sansāra), while other traditions provided the means to escape imminent cataclysms 
(Overmyer 1999). Structural parallels in organization, but also in rhetoric, facilitated the shift of 
‘sectarians’ to Christianity (cf. Austin 2007: 68-69, 376-378, cf. Bays 1983, 1985 and 1991); after 
                                                 
6  This terminology is not confined to the religious economy model. A similar terminology, substituting ‘rewards’ 
with ‘goods’ – an explicit echo of the Weberian concept of ‘salvation goods’ or Heilsgüter – is used by Stolz 2008: 
61. 
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all, they came from a background where religious groups were led by entrepreneurial types and 
where competition as well as shifts from one group to another were common (Tiedemann 2001: 
116; cf. Seiwert 2003: 445-454; Gaustad 2000: 19-21). 
Having discussed the religious dimension of conversions, I next turn to economic incentives. 
In contrast to the earlier emphasis on the so-called ‘rice’ or ‘millet Christians’, recent studies have 
demonstrated that converts actually came from a very mixed social background and included a 
not insignificant number of members of the rural elite, landlords and local literati, i. e. degree-
holders who had passed the lower state exams and were thus qualified to hold office (Tiedemann 
2001: 118-120; Klein 2002: 199). This is not to say that nobody ever converted for economic 
reasons; quite the contrary. However, the economic argument needs some qualification. It has 
often been particularly emphasized, for example, that converts sought employment with the 
mission (Tiedemann 2001: 118-119, Najarian 1982: 86-88). However, the prospects of succeeding 
were not too bright. According to the Protestant survey of 1918-1921, an average 7.3% of church 
communicants were employed as evangelists, teachers and medical personnel by the mission 
societies in the 19 provinces of China, with figures going up to between 11.2 and 12.3% in 
Hunan, Sichuan and Anhui (Stauffer 1922: 291). 7  As the statistics for the one province of 
Guangdong in the same survey show, the ratio of employed communicants could vary: Whereas 
the provincial average was only 4.7%, individual mission societies reported a figure of up to 13% 
(ibid.: 166). Even adding those who were employed in the households of the over 6,500 
missionaries (ibid.: 287) as cooks, nursemaids or servants, the official figure of around 25,000 
Chinese employees would probably not more than double. In total, then, one out of seven 
communicants ended up in the service of either mission societies or, privately, in that of the 
missionaries. Although might be assumed that the proportion of employed agents was greater in 
the early years of Protestant missions, figures from the 1870s are surprisingly similar (Najarian 
1982: 86). 
 Missionary help might take other forms, however. For example, Christian congregations 
sometimes held land which they rented out to church members; moreover, missionaries were a 
source of cheap credit, which was always in high demand in Chinese rural society, with money 
usually being lent at horrendous interest rates and a high proportion of peasant households in 
serious debt (Klein 2002: 200-201; cf. Tawney 1932: 58-63, Osterhammel 1997: 176). Christian 
missions also engaged in famine relief, most notably during the great North China Famine of 
1876-1879, and in their efforts partly competed and partly collaborated with Chinese networks 
                                                 
7  The one noteworthy exception was Xinjiang (at the time a Special Administrative District), where the ratio of 
employed workers reached 48% of communicants, but this was due to low membership figures.  
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(Edgerton-Tarpley 2009, Lee 2009). Both after this famine and a subsequent one in 1889, the 
number of converts in areas of North China increased significantly (Tiedemann 2001: 120-121). 
Another kind of economic incentives has more recently come under scrutiny: The Christians’ 
exemption from ‘idol taxes’. Communal religious activities, in particular festivals in honour of 
deities (and the local operas that were a standard feature of such festivals), were regularly 
financed by contributions from villagers. After the toleration edict of 1862 had freed Christians 
from this obligation, many of them did in fact refuse to pay their share (Austin 2007: 158-160, 
257; Tiedemann 2001: 119). There is evidence that Chinese preachers used this effective 
reduction of the Christians’ financial burden as an argument to attract non-Christians to the 
message of the Gospel. It is all the more credible because the missionaries who recorded this 
practice openly disapproved of it because it appealed to the allegedly ‘materialist’ outlook of the 
Chinese (Klein 2002: 201). 
Finally, I shall examine the socio-political motives. For the most part, these were based on the 
missionaries’ ability to act as local power brokers, for which the unequal treaties in conjunction 
with the Imperial toleration edicts provided the legal framework. Strictly speaking, the former 
only protected foreign nationals, whereas the latter sanctioned the persecution of Christians on 
account of their religion. In practice, whenever missionaries could prove that a ‘persecution’ of 
Christians had taken place, they were able to secure the support of the Chinese authorities and, if 
these proved unwilling, to the diplomatic representatives of their native countries. This enabled 
the missionaries to wield considerable power at the local level, especially against the background 
of the local ‘culture of violence’ that was a constant feature of rural life in nineteenth-century 
China and beyond (Tiedemann 1998; cf. Bianco 2005, Lamley 1990 and 1977). Both inter- and 
intra-communal conflicts between villages and/or descent groups over scarce resources were the 
order of the day, with government officials often reluctant to interfere. Missionaries, however, 
were not hesitant to mobilize the Chinese state in support of their and their Christians’ interests. 
In a society in which ‘strong’ communities recklessly used their resources of fighting men as 
well as their financial reserves against ‘weak’ ones, conversion to Christianity provided 
disempowered groups with access to a new source of strength, thereby reversing existing power 
relations. The more missionaries demonstrated their capability of holding both the state and 
stronger communities in check, the more consciously their protection was sought after. By the 
1890s, this had developed into a sophisticated strategy in which rivalling communities made use 
of the divide between Protestants and Catholics in order to mobilize an external source of power 
to support them in their conflicts. Christianity and the international politico-legal framework in 
which it operated in China were thus functionalized for local power games (Klein 2005: 285-294, 
Lee 2003, Jörgensen 2001). It was only after the Boxer Uprising had made both mission societies 
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and Chinese officials more wary of the dangers associated with this strategy that steps were taken 
to ease tensions rather than fuel them. 
Having discussed the main motives for conversion, I wish to add two general characteristics 
that unite almost all of them: First of all, joining Christianity in general was the result of 
individual decision. Sectarians often converted in groups (Tiedemann 2001: 117), and in some 
localities, the drive towards Christianity took on the character of a social movement (Klein 2002: 
205). However, in the latter case it is doubtful if this was more than an aggregation of individual 
conversions, although local or kinship ties clearly facilitated the process (Lutz and Lutz 1995: 
218-220). The best indicator for the individual character of conversions in China is that, 
notwithstanding the overall importance of the family in both Chinese culture and society in 
missionary strategy, families rarely converted as a whole. As late as 1922, the China National 
Christian Conference sought to develop a strategy to “win the family to a greater degree than the 
present would indicate” (quoted in May Chen 1998: 176). In particular, there is evidence to 
suggest that women, although assigned a socially inferior role, were under no obligation to 
convert along with their husbands. On the other hand, it was almost impossible for a married 
woman to convert without the consent of her husband (Klein 2002: 206-207). The result was a 
surplus of Christian men in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After more than a 
half-century of hard work to win over females to Christianity, the survey of the China 
Continuation Committee still yielded an average of 63% male communicants in all of China 
(Stauffer 1922: 293). 
Second, regardless of whether they were driven by religious or secular motives, Chinese 
converts were steeped in the concepts and traditions of Chinese religions, in particular popular 
religion. This had important consequences for their conversions. As David Jordan has stated on 
the basis of anthropological fieldwork, conversion to Christianity is conditional upon pre-existing 
beliefs, and it is additive, which means that new beliefs do not replace older ones, but are grafted 
upon them (Jordan 1993). This becomes very clear as we look at cases where the Christian god 
was incorporated in the existing pantheon – and which missionaries and Chinese evangelists 
sought to suppress – or where Christian missionaries were invited as religious specialists to 
perform rainmaking ceremonies (Lutz and Lutz 1998: 191, Klein 2002: 192-193). One wonders 
whether the term ‘conversion’ is appropriate at all, as neophytes – at least initially – tended to 
experience Christianity not as a new religion, but as a new option within their wonted religious 
framework. Thus it not only took them a long time to develop a Christian identity, making 
conversion a process rather than a datable experience in the evangelical or pietist sense (Lutz 
2008: 7-9); even more critically, the outcome of this process was not necessarily congruent with 
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missionary expectations. This was to have consequences for the emergence of a Chinese 
Christianity, to which we now turn. 
 
 
Strict churches or negotiated Christianity? 
 
From the above discussion it should have become clear that conversion to Christianity was 
conceptualized in diametrically opposed ways by missionaries and Chinese Christians. Rooted in 
North American and European revivalism, evangelicalism and pietism, the missionaries had high 
expectations of both the spiritual depth and moral bearing of Christians, both in their native 
countries and in the mission fields. Missionary standards thus far surpassed those of the average 
North American and European Christians, who viewed their Christianity in rather formal terms.  
On the other hand, many if not all Chinese Christians approached their new religion against the 
backdrop of popular religion. The Christian god was measured against the yardstick of ling, and if 
he failed to deliver (or an alternative option proved more attractive), their membership in the 
church could be called into question, as in the following example: 
“In Luogang [a village in Northeastern Guangdong] there was a Christian woman. Once she 
could not find her water buffalo and went to see a medium (tongshen 童神) [about this]. The 
medium said: ‘You shouldn’t have embraced the [Christian] teaching and gone to church. As for 
your water buffalo, it can be retrieved.’ When the buffalo was indeed retrieved, she didn’t go to 
church for a long time. The missionary and [Chinese] preacher specially went to exhort her, and 
she corrected herself and came back” (Zhang Zuji 1980 [1928-1934]). 
The missionaries certainly were not blind to the extent to which Chinese Christians were 
willing to strike compromises between their new and old religions, and this was one of the 
reasons why they imposed on them a system of surveillance and sanctions. Church discipline was 
central to the mission effort (cf. Lechler 1890, Corbett 1890). As a rule, a wide range of possible 
sanctions could be applied, ranging from exhortation to exclusion from Holy Communion to 
outright expulsion from the congregation. In this attempt at strictly separating Christians from all 
forms of indigenous religions as well as from as number of cultural and social practices, mission 
churches differed radically from Chinese religious lay groups, which by and large exhibited a 
rather conservative outlook at state and society (Overmyer 1984 and 1999: 210-213). Although 
these groups shared with Christian missions a dichotomic division of mankind into the adherents 
of the group on the one hand and the indifferent majority on the other, sectarian groups seem to 
have kept a low profile and carefully avoided tensions with society at large (except when some of 
them occasionally rebelled against the government). For example, their members participated in 
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‘normal’ religious activities of local communities (cf. Li and Naquin 1988), something that 
Protestant (as well as Catholic) missionaries would have found unthinkable. 
The effects of the mission societies’ disciplinary strategies had far-reaching repercussions, not 
only within the congregations, but also within society at large. To begin with, as missionaries did 
their utmost to enforce the strict regulations governing the mission congregations, there was 
some degree of fluctuation within the congregations. As the above example suggests, some 
Christians left the church of their own volition, but others were expelled by the missionaries. On 
the other hand, converts who complied with the rules could come under severe pressure from 
their non-Christian peers. Often they were held accountable for all misfortunes happening to 
themselves or, even worse, occurring in their neighbourhood (Klein 2002: 206). At the 
communal level, the refusal of Christians to participate in collective religious activities might lead 
to tensions, as these activities were only regarded as efficacious if all members took part. 
Tensions of this kind were one factor  behind the so-called ‘missionary cases’ (jiao’an 教案), 
violent clashes involving missionaries or converts that had to be dealt with by the Chinese 
authorities and foreign diplomats. A number of well-documented jiao’an arose from Christians 
withholding contributions to temple festivals (Lee 2003: 149-153, Zhao Shuhao 2000: 66-67, 
Litzinger 1996). For the Christians, there was thus no easy way out of the established religious 
communities. On the other hand, given the general tendency in historical material to prioritize 
conflict over quotidian harmony – a bias reinforced in this case by the political framework and 
the actors’ vested interests –, there is much to suggest that the Christian religion may not have 
been ‘regarded as all that alien’ and that ‘the more common pattern of peaceful coexistence’ 
simply has largely gone unnoticed (Tiedemann 2001: 108-109). This opens up a new perspective 
emphasizing the many links between Chinese Christians and non-Christians, which had far-
reaching consequences of the relationship between missionaries and converts and between 
Christian congregations and society at large. 
Let me begin with the former and look at some statistical material first. To my knowledge, no 
synthesis of data on the practice of church discipline has been produced so far. I will therefore 
have to limit myself to spot-checks here. For the year 1920, the statistical survey undertaken by 
the China Continuation Committee mentions 85,140 baptized persons who were not 
communicants. Even if we assume that all of these were excluded from communication as a 
disciplinary measure (and this is impossible, since the category must have included a sizeable 
portion of children), the conclusion is that this form of medium-level disciplinary action was 
taken against a maximum of 18 per cent of all baptized Christians in that year (cf. Stauffer 1922: 
xci). More significant is a set of data on the exclusionary practice of the Basel Mission between 
1880 and 1910. These data suggest that on a ten-year average, between one and 1.7% of 
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Christians were expelled from the congregations (Klein 2002: 241) – a remarkably low figure, 
given the fact that transgressions of the converts formed a large portion of what the missionaries 
reported back to their home boards. There are several possible explanations for this: The 
majority of Christians may have complied with the rules, but it is equally possible that the 
missionaries found it difficult to learn of violations. In the rural areas where the majority of 
Chinese Christians resided (cities were a different matter), the congregations which they 
supervised from central mission stations covered a vast territory, and even periodic visitations 
were insufficient to exercise tight control over Christians. Finally, it is possible that the 
missionaries did sense the magnitude of the problem, but regarded expulsion as an ultima ratio to 
be applied when all other means had failed. The ambiguity of the statistical material is backed up 
by the complexity of missionary discourse on Chinese Christians: Depending on the context, 
missionaries either construed the ‘good’ Christian as the diametrical opposite of the ‘evil’ heathen 
or distinguished between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Christians or portrayed them as generically defective, 
pointing to their ‘entanglement’ with Chinese culture (Klein 2004: 40). 
Occasionally, missionary sources do suggest that the influence of the non-Christian social 
environment on converts was greater than the missionaries were ready or able to admit. In the 
Basel Mission again, there is photographic evidence that Christians continued to wear a specific 
sort of charm against evil spirits, although this practice is hardly ever mentioned in the written 
reports of the missionaries (Klein 2004: 42-46). With regard to exorcism, which before the 
coming of Pentecostalism to China in the early twentieth century was viewed with scepticism in 
most missionary churches, Alvyn Austin has argued that it was a “secretive practice among 
Chinese Christians before it came to the attention of the missionaries” (Austin 2007: 262, cf. Lian 
Xi 2010: 27-31). Even when it did, they were circumspect in publicly acknowledging the fact  (cf. 
Austin 2007: 262). It is therefore possible to conclude that the missionaries failed to notice some 
of the cultural fusions between Christianity and Chinese popular religion or glossed over them in 
their reports and publications. 
In other cases, missionaries realized that they had to make concessions. After a lengthy 
discussion spanning more than two decades, the Basel Mission in the late 1890 allowed Chinese 
Christians to partake of sacrificial meat provided they were not present at the sacrifice itself. In 
justifying their decision, its missionaries referred both to the social conditions of Chinese local 
society and the rather ambiguous discussion of sacrificial meat in the New Testament (Klein 
2002: 228-230). A much thornier issue was how to deal with polygamy and child marriages, 
practices rooted in ancestor worship (and the ensuing necessity to produce male offspring to 
continue the family line). In trying to suppress the former, the missionaries were walking on 
slippery ground because the independent study of the Bible as encouraged by the Protestants 
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could bring Chinese Christians to the conclusion that polygamy was a legitimate practice, since 
they could find appropriate examples in the Old Testament (Lutz and Lutz 1998: 42, Klein 2002: 
231, 338). Child marriages, on the other hand, had many economic and social implications and 
were transactions entailing mutual responsibilities for all parties involved. As missionaries who 
became more familiar with the local cultures of peasant China began to realize the complexities 
of the social life in which the Christians were enmeshed, they became more willing to strike 
compromises and to rely on an inward transformation rather than on externally imposed rules 
(cf. Records of the General Conference 1890: 656). 
This does not mean that mission societies were ready to forgo church discipline altogether; 
what it does show is that part of the missionaries began to realize the opposing forces which 
were pulling at the mission congregations from two sides: Whereas the missionaries sought to 
maintain a state of high tension between Christianity on the one hand and Chinese religions, 
society and culture on the other, the Christians both from their own inclination and under the 
influence of their non-Christian kin and neighbours were ready to compromise. In the century or 
so that the churches were missionary-dominated, these forces remained in an uneasy equilibrium 
as the dynamics of evangelization pulled a small but steady stream of converts towards the 
Christian congregations. It therefore makes sense to view Chinese Christianity in the missionary 
era as a ‘negotiated Christianity’ that drew both on the missionary concept of ‘strict churches’ as 
on the entanglement of the Christians with local society and culture. 
An assessment of the concept of ‘strict churches’ in China during the missionary era will 
benefit from a comparison with two related phenomena: A comparative glance at the Taiping 
movement may point the way Christian congregations would have developed without missionary 
control, whereas a brief examination of the indigenous Christianity that emerged in the early 
twentieth century will show whether the tensions between Christianity and Chinese society were 
maintained or eased as indigenous leaders increasingly took over from the missionaries. 
The Taiping movement 太平 originated in the vision of Hong Xiuquan and his subsequent 
interpretation thereof, by which he established himself as the younger brother of Jesus Christ 
(Reilly 2004, Kuhn 1977). In order to promote, Hong founded an association called the God 
Worshipers’ Society (Bai Shangdi Hui 拜上帝會) , which grew from a few hundred followers of 
Hong in 1845 to several thousand members in 1851. In this year, following a number of clashes 
with the Imperial authorities, Hong proclaimed the Heavenly Kingdom of Eternal Peace (Taiping 
tianguo 太平天國) and became the founder of an ephemeral state in Central China that lasted 
until its destruction at the hands of the Imperial government in 1864. Part of the dynamics of the 
movement originated from the civil war situation in which this state-building effort took place 
and from the coercive measures which the government adopted. Most importantly, it organized 
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the population into units of 25 families each under a sergeant whose duties included the 
supervision of communal religious activities. Thus conversion to the Taiping religion was not 
necessarily voluntary, and in fact the degree of faith and adherence to the movement varied 
across time and space (Reilly 2004: 117). 
As a religious movement, the Taiping tianguo is hard to categorize. There is a sound case for 
regarding it as the outcome of a “folk religionization of Christianity” (Liu Ying-hua 2010, cf. also 
Reilly 2004: 6, 114, Wagner 1998: 133, for a contrasting view cf. Bohr 2004). What is important 
in our context is that the Taiping religion maintained a state of high tension with Chinese society 
throughout its existence. Iconoclastic in nature, it openly attacked all diffused and 
institutionalized forms of Chinese religions, including folk religion and notably ancestor worship 
as well as Buddhism and in particular Confucianism and even the institution of the Chinese 
emperor, who for the Taiping had become an ‘idol’ himself (Reilly 134-139). They no doubt drew 
confirmation of this attitude from the Bible, which – in a specific Chinese translation – they 
regarded as the supreme authoritative text (Reilly 2004: 133-134, Covell 1986: 152-156). On the 
other hand, its doctrines contained both popular religious and Confucian elements that appealed 
to people with a background in Chinese religions, in particular popular religion, as well as the 
millenarianism of folk lay groups (Bohr 2004: 393-394). To begin with, Hong regarded himself as 
part of a Heavenly family that included God, Jesus Christ, himself and their wives – a family, 
moreover, that functioned along the same principles as the Chinese family (Liu Ying-hua 2010: 
100-101, Shih 1967: 4-15). Another important element in Taiping religion was a specific form of 
shamanism (wu 巫 ), in which a deity possesses a medium and speaks through them. The 
prophetic messages proclaimed not only by Hong himself, but also some of his lieutenants, had 
their origins in this belief and not in Old Testament prophecy. By the same token, Taiping 
exorcism borrowed from popular Daoism rather than from examples in the New Testament (Liu 
Ying-hua 2010: 101-103, Shih 1967: 320-328). Finally, the Taiping concept of sin echoed the 
Confucian belief that human nature is originally good rather than viewing sin as the original 
human condition that can only be escaped through Christ’s redemption (Covell 1986: 162-166, 
Shih 1967: 181-183). Taiping Christianity thus spoke to Chinese religious concepts in ways that 
the missionaries could not and would not. Even so, it is doubtful whether those control measures 
put in place by the Taiping leadership were effective in guiding the religious behaviour of the 
rank and file, especially under the unstable conditions of civil war under which the Taiping 
operated (cf. Shih 1967: 23-29). 
The emergence of an indigenous Christianity was the result of two trajectories that were 
interrelated, but also in conflict with one another: The first, which is well-covered in the 
literature, was the devolution of authority from the mission societies and the ‘Western’ 
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missionaries to Chinese institutions such as the interdenominational and rather liberal Church of 
Christ in China (Zhonghua Jidujiaohui 中華基督教會), founded in 1927, and to an indigenous 
clergy. This process, often referred to as indigenization and carried out under the slogan of the 
“three self” (Bays 1995: 124 f.) – self-administration, self-support and self-propagation, phrases 
borrowed from early nineteenth-century ‘Western’ mission leaders (cf. Williams 2008 and 1990) –
, was, in most cases, tortuous and conflict-ridden. The reason was that the majority of 
missionaries were loath to part with the authority which they hitherto had been able to wield 
(Klein 2002, Chang 1999, Bickers 1996, Heininger 1982, Zha Shijie 1993: 32-35, but cf. Lodwick 
1990, Hood 1986). It therefore comes as no surprise that tensions within the mission 
congregations peaked during the high tide of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s (Lian Xi 2004: 
852-855). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, independent churches broke away 
from mission-led organizations, but these retained many denominational features (Xu Yihua 
2004: 108) On the other hand, the 1920s also saw the development of indigenization theology, a 
liberal attempt to  reconcile Christian beliefs with Chinese values (mostly those of Confucianism) 
at an academic theological level (So 1998, Chao 1992). After 1949, these divergent strands ended 
up under the umbrella of the Three Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), a mass organization closely 
supervised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Xu Yihua 2004).  
The other, which has more recently attracted scholarly attention, was the formation of 
indigenous Christian groups in the early twentieth century. The True Jesus Church, the Jesus 
Family, the Little Flock and others, including some independent figures, shared as their 
characteristic “a potent mix of evangelistic fervor, biblical literalism, charismatic ecstasies, and a 
fiery eschatology not infrequently tinged with nationalistic exuberance” (Lian Xi 2010: 2, cf. Bays 
1995). It is quite plausible that, as Lian Xi has argued in his ground-breaking study, these 
groupings were the key players in transforming Christianity from the ‘foreign religion’ (yangjiao 洋
教) it had been in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries into a popular mass religion 
probably numbering around 30 million adherents as of today (ibid.).8  
How this was possible has yet to be ascertained, however. I find it difficult to take on board 
Lian’s emphasis on the link between Christian and traditional Chinese millenarianism, which 
picks up the argument developed earlier by Daniel Bays on the ‘sectarian’ connections of Chinese 
Christianity (Lian Xi 2010: 235-240, cf. Bays 1983, 1985 and 1991). It is by no means certain that 
                                                 
8  For the importance of these ‘number games’ cf. Bays 2003: 185. For the mid-1990s, Währisch-Oblau (1996: 530) 
quotes estimates ranging from 8.5 million to more than 65 million Protestants, dismissing the latter as 
unsubstantiated. Fiedler (2010: 72) allows for a maximum of 40 million, but considers estimates of 25-30 million 
as most credible. Aikman (2003: 6-8) gives the decidedly most optimistic figures, estimating the combined 
Protestant-Catholic strength at more than 80 million as opposed to the official claims of only 21 million. 
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the influence of popular religious lay groups permeated Chinese society in such a way as to 
account for the soaring of membership in Christian churches, even if we concede that it was 
certainly not limited to these groups’ rather circumscribed membership. From the available 
evidence one might infer that the independent charismatic groups shifted the emphasis from the 
disciplinarian focus of the missionary congregations to a focus on spiritual experience. It must be 
noted, though, that those churches with a missionary background, most of which became self-
governing in this period, experienced a similar shift, as Chinese church leaders strove both to 
improve the quality of Christians and to significantly increase their number (Sun Ensan 1931: 1). 
Independent lay evangelists were especially successful in increasing spirituality among church 
members (Gieß 1929, cf. Bays 1996: 313-315). Their activities no doubt helped to consolidate a 
sense of Christian identity as well as orthodoxy and orthopraxy. On the other hand, it 
contributed to the increasing perception of Christianity as a Chinese religion, thereby reducing 
tensions with society at large. Notwithstanding the shifting religious policies of the Nationalist 
and even more the Communist government after 1927 and 1949 respectively, the long-term 
consequences of the organizational and conceptual transformation of Christian congregations are 
probably still felt in the unprecedented and explosive growth of Chinese Christianity in the 
‘reform’ era since 1978. The two most quoted factors behind this growth, faith healing and 
community orientation (Fiedler 2010, Währisch-Oblau 2001), work in different ways: While the 
former clearly is a bridge to popular religious concepts – important because the overwhelming 
majority of newcomers have their roots in popular religion –, the second builds on a reinforced 
sense of Christian identity.  
Finally, it has to be noted that the expansion of Chinese Christianity has been accompanied by 
enormous diversification, allowing us to identify three major sectors: One the one hand, there is a 
‘bureaucratic’ sector formed by the indigenization of mission churches and focused on the China 
Christian Council (CCC) and TSPM. Evangelical in orientation, it relies on its institutional 
structure, is led by professional theologians and pursues a top-down approach, although it lacks a 
fully established hierarchy. The ‘charismatic’9 sector mostly arose out of the indigenous groups 
discussed above; it is very much a grassroots movement under the leadership of laypeople. It is 
also overwhelmingly female; a proportion of 60-90% of women (Währisch-Oblau 1996: 532-533) 
means a dramatic reversal of the male preponderance in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Influenced by popular religion, the ‘charismatic’ sector is not limited to the so-called 
‘house churches’, which distance themselves from the CCC, but also exists under the umbrella of 
                                                 
9  In context of this paragraph, the term ‘charismatic’ (in quotation marks) is not used to denote a charismatic form 
of Christianity (as above), but points to a grassroots version of Christianity that tends to be independent of 
guidance by professional and academic theologians. 
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the latter organization, as for historical reasons the individual congregations enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy (Oblau 2001).  
At the fringes of Protestant Christianity, there has emerged what Kristin Kupfer (2010: 29) 
has called ‘Christian-inspired movements’. By this term she characterizes new religious groups 
that take some of their inspiration and concepts from Christianity, yet base their message of 
salvation and charismatic healing on the charismatic and authoritative powers of their leaders. 
Like the popular religious lay groups of old, they have developed a hierarchical structure by 
grouping their followers into different levels. The ‘folk-religionization’ of Christianity in these 
movements is much stronger than in the case of the Taiping movement, and their connection 
with mainstream Christian doctrines and practices is extremely loose. It is important to note in 
passing that both ‘house churches’ and ‘Christian-inspired movements’ are not part of the 
religious sector acknowledged as legitimate by the Communist party-state; as a consequence, both 
frequently become targets of persecution by the authorities. 
What is more important in the context of this paper is the diversification of Christianity, 
which seems to have had two effects: On the one hand, it confirms the impression that Chinese 
Protestant Christianity in the post-missionary age has lowered tensions with society at large to a 
considerable degree. On the other hand, this process is by no means even, and in many sectors of 
Chinese Protestantism, the continued existence of a clergy that has in some ways inherited the 
role of the missionaries and seeks to maintain what it perceives to be higher standards of 
Christianity shows the continuation of tensions both within the church and between church and 
society after the demise of missionary leadership. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What can the ‘supply-side model’ contribute to our understanding of conversions to 
Christianity in the history of modern China? Conversely, how does the history of (Protestant) 
Christianity in modern China illuminate the ‘supply-side model’ of the religious economists and 
its explanation of religious change? 
At a first glance, the above analysis bears out a number of central assumptions of the ‘supply-
side’ model. To begin with, the history of Chinese Protestant Christianity, a nineteenth-century 
religious newcomer in China, suggests that religious change is influenced by the supply rather 
than by the demand side. In their initial approaches to the ‘foreign teaching’, Chinese converts 
viewed Christianity not as a new type of religion – in fact they lacked the very term and concept 
of ‘religion’ in its modern sense –, but rather as an option that added to those already available to 
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them. There is nothing to indicate that without Christianity, these people would not have found 
within their established religious framework a solution for their personal crises which might have 
satisfied them. This becomes clear as we look at the motives for their conversion, which hardly 
indicate a notable shift in religious demand. In fact, as the missionaries found much to their 
chagrin, they pointed not to any spiritual needs or a hunger for redemption, but rather to the 
same aspects of human existence that the majority sought to deal with within the framework of 
folk religion or one of the established institutionalized religions. 
Second, converts can be grouped into different niches according to their preferences, whether 
these may have been luck change, hope for economic betterment or a desire for protection. 
Although these motives did not differ from the mindset of the population writ large, the fact that 
only a fraction of the population flocked to the missionaries indicates that converts’ demands 
must have been stronger than those of others to make them to cross the threshold to 
Christianity. There was a lot to deter them from becoming Christian: an alien and often repulsive 
imagery and terminology and – as people began to develop an understanding of Christianity, 
however distorted it may have been – the pressure from their non-Christian neighbours and kin. 
These tensions with the converts’ immediate social environment (which the missionaries may 
have exaggerated in their reports) must be weighed against those cases where social networks did 
facilitate the spread of Christianity. The factors pulling them to the foreign religion must have 
been strong indeed, be they disappointment at the established forms of religion, economic 
hardship (which was not necessarily identical with poverty) or lack of power. The paradox of 
Chinese conversions to Christianity was that on the one hand, as they took place amidst 
contending influences, converts must have been very clear that they were making a choice, while 
on the other hand they were ignorant of the standards by which they were measured in their new 
religion. For the majority of neophytes, the term ‘seekers of truth’ actually was a misnomer. 
Finally, the first Chinese Protestant churches originated under the leadership of missionaries 
and as small, ‘sect’-like groups that closely monitored the activities of their members and 
sanctioned transgressions. This resulted in high tensions between the Chinese Christian 
congregations and the rest of society, although these tensions were eased somewhat in the early 
twentieth century as the missionary era drew to a close. At any rate, both the evidence on the 
ephemeral Taiping movement and on indigenous Christian churches would confirm that groups 
allowing for a greater cultural continuity were more dynamic and successful in attracting 
adherents. However, this is not necessarily true of the contemporary ‘Christian-inspired’ 
movements, some of which remain rather small, while others expand (Kupfer 2010: 237).10 
                                                 
10  One would have to determine for each of these groups to what extent state persecution plays a role in their 
successes or failures, but this clearly surpasses the limitations of this article. 
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At closer inspection, questions remain. For one thing, the concept of religious firms – which 
appears rather underdetermined in Acts of Faith as compared to earlier versions of the religious 
economy model (cf. Iannaccone 1998: 1482-1485) – would suggest that these are organizations 
with a propensity for maximal growth. This does not dovetail nicely with one of the central 
tensions in early Chinese Protestant Christianity: the contradiction between dynamic advertising 
on the one hand and strictness on the other. In theory, missionaries were working towards the 
Christianization of all of China, and there is no doubt that they spent a lot of energy on 
advertising Christianity. On the other hand, they conceived of their congregations as ‘strict’, 
closely monitored organizations and therefore were very restrictive in admitting new members. 
Independent missionaries such as Gützlaff, who aimed at the conversion of the largest possible 
number of Chinese in the shortest possible time, were in a minority, while the majority of 
missionaries prioritized ‘quality’ over ‘quantity’. This raises the question of whether the religious 
economy model has adequately addressed the standards of religious expansion. This question 
becomes even more pressing when, leaving Christianity aside for a moment, we address those 
sectors of ‘diffused’ Chinese religion that the overwhelming majority of Chinese Christians came 
from. Their membership was defined by kinship or settlement and therefore stable by definition, 
and while they clearly did not proselytize (quite the contrary), there also was no easy way to opt 
out of them, as many Christian converts would experience to their detriment. 
Another question concerns the problem of cultural continuity. According to the ‘supply-side 
model’, religious organizations are more successful in attracting followers to the extent that they 
allow for a cultural continuity. It is one of the strange paradoxes of the history of Christian 
missions in China, however, that while the majority of the population stayed aloof from 
Christianity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because of its alien character, most if 
not all converts seem to have found it easy to interpret their new faith in terms of concepts 
inherited from popular religion. This phenomenon is not really covered by Stark’s notion of 
‘cultural continuity’ as explained above (Stark 2003: 261). In particular, Stark fails to address the 
cultural baggage of converts as an interpretive framework with which to address their new 
religion, which is precisely what defined Chinese conversions to Christianity. Thus while Stark’s 
concept is able to account for the low membership figures of Protestant congregations up to 
1949 – because Christianity was so culturally different from Chinese traditions – , it fails to 
explain the character of the conversion process itself, which was so strongly determined by 
Chinese popular religion. 
As a consequence of the lingering influence of popular religion, perhaps the most 
fundamental tension running through the missionary-led Christian congregations was that 
between the missionaries’ expectations of conversion as a spiritual rebirth and the predispositions 
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of Chinese Christians as outlined above. To explain this as a low degree of religious commitment 
– understood as the failure to meet the obligations of the Christian God as defined by the 
missionaries – is to miss the point. The concepts of religious organizations are not fixed; they 
may shift and they allow for some degree of flexibility, as the missionaries’ willingness to 
compromise on some issues clearly shows. On the other hand, it might be argued that the 
lowering of tensions was the result and not a precondition of the post-1978 expansion of 
Protestant Christianity. As a consequence of its rapid spread at the grassroots level, the Chinese 
‘bureaucratic sector’ – which, as we have seen, to some extent has inherited the missionary 
tradition, in particular when it comes to the ‘quality’ of Christians – found it even more difficult 
to control the religious knowledge, beliefs and practices of ordinary Christians. The role of 
independent churches in this process (and especially its attitude towards church discipline) needs 
to be better understood, but the available evidence seems to suggest that while they may have laid 
the groundwork for Protestantism to be accepted as a ‘Chinese’ religion, prior to 1949 (or even 
1978), their growth was not remarkably faster than that of the mission-led churches.  
One of the fundamental problems of the ‘supply-side model’ is its disinterest in religious 
concepts.11 In fact, not only do emic perspectives hardly play any role, but it also seems that 
empirical evidence is occasionally bent to suit the theoretical framework rather than vice versa. 
There is, for example, no instrument to deal with ancestor worship – religion is an exchange 
relationship with god(s), while every handling of supernatural forces without reference to god(s) 
counts as magic. As ancestor worship clearly is not magic, is it legitimate to subsume ancestors 
under the category of ‘good gods’ (Stark and Finke 2000: 97)? To answer in the affirmative would 
gloss over the enormous differences between the two categories, which are important for the 
understanding of Christianity in China, both because of the way ancestor worship inhibited 
conversion and because of the missionary responses to the phenomenon. 
In fact, although the ‘supply-side model’ further develops the religious economy approach in 
that it takes social and cultural factors into account, it still lacks an adequate understanding of the 
cultural implications of religious change. For example, advocates of the ‘supply-side model’ posit 
unequivocal terms of religious exchange, more or less explicitly assuming a hierarchy of rewards, 
with life after death at the top because it is the most costly, involving an exclusive relationship 
with one god and not to be gained in the here and now. If this logic were so clear to religious 
actors as religious economists seem to assume, one wonders how people might not see the 
advantages. After all, this is not like buying a luxury item one cannot afford, it is about shunning 
costs that it would be in one’s power to bear. The problem is that, as even some economists and 
                                                 
11  Bruce (2000: 42) talks about the supply-siders’ lack of “reference to differences in theology or ecclesiology” – an 
understanding that must be broadened for the purpose of this article. 
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sociologists now argue, the value of goods is not naturally given, but an interpretive construct 
(Jagd 2007: 76; cf. Dosse 1998: 258-261, Storper and Salais 1997: 19). It is therefore impossible to 
“begin with an actor free of all such [cultural] constraints” and see “how culture is discovered 
and accumulated” because religious actors are always cultural beings. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Christianity was not an option for the overwhelming majority of the Chinese 
because they were content with what benefits they received from their religious activity. 
Missionaries found it difficult to convince them of the need for salvation because this idea had 
no place within their cultural framework. Conversions to Christianity took place because the 
missionaries were offering their religion (the supply side) and because in a recurring pattern (the 
niche), people had demands that the traditional religious options seemingly could not fulfil (the 
demand side) – but these demands were articulated against the converts’ own cultural 
background. 
Finally, the ‘supply-side model’ treats religion more or less as a closed system. Religious 
change is attributed to shifts in a ‘religious economy’ which consists solely of adherents, 
organizations and the “religious culture” offered by the latter (Stark and Finke 2000: 193). 
However, the model ignores that religions are linked to other aspects of social existence, such as 
politics, culture and the economy, which influence the dynamics of religions and in particular 
religious change. Economic incentives did play a certain role in conversions to Christianity in late 
Imperial and early Republican times, and even more so the ability of missionaries to act as power 
brokers and manipulate local power structures – to the extent that the missionaries themselves 
ended up being manipulated. On the other hand, the shift from an overwhelmingly male to an 
even more overwhelmingly female Protestantism must be attributed to the dramatic change in 
the status of women in Chinese society between the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. 
In this sense, niches were formed not only through (shifting) religious preferences, but also 
through sociocultural transformations. 
Given the insufficiencies of the religious economy model, there is no doubt a need to go 
‘beyond the market’ in explaining religious change in modern China. Religious supply, demand 
and competition should be seen as forces working on the dynamics of religious traditions and 
interactions between religions, but they should not be addressed as ‘naturally given’ in the 
tradition of neoclassical economics. Rather, they are cultural constructs, the result of interpretive 
frameworks that govern the shift from one religion to another. Thus, religious change is 
governed by cultural interpretations, as well as social transformations and political power shifts. 
In a critique and expansion of Bourdieuan theory, Goossaert and Palmer (2011: 9-11) have 
identified the ‘religious field’ in China as a not only religious, but also political project that – 
almost by definition – remained incomplete, both inscribing itself into a wider religious landscape 
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and relating to other ‘fields’ in society. Christian missionaries has played an important part in the 
emergence this project in the nineteenth century, but the result of their activities has been mixed. 
On the one hand, Christian attempts to denigrate all non-Christian religions as superstitions have 
left traces in the Chinese intellectual and political realm; on the other – as I have shown in this 
paper – missionaries have been unable to prevent ‘superstitions’ from working their way into 
Christianity. 
Coming full circle, I will finally address the question whether Christianity was indeed more 
competitive on the Chinese market. The religious economists’ claims that exclusive religions 
always win is overly optimistic because of the historical examples they cite, Christianity and Islam 
have emerged as dominant religions because they managed to ally – or to be identical – with the 
highest-level political power. In view of the above discussion, one might say that they made 
possible the construction of a ‘religious field’. From what we know about the present condition 
of China, it is far from likely that Christianity will be an attractive basis on which to build a 
political project for the Chinese Communist Party, which holds the reins of political power in 
Beijing and will continue to do so. Seen in this light, David Aikman’s (2003: 285-287) prediction 
that around 20-30 per cent of the Chinese population will become Christians within the next 
three decades, leading to a dominance of the Christian world view in China’s political and cultural 
establishment and possibly to a global burden-sharing between the People’s Republic and the 
United States, appears to be a rather self-serving fantasy. Chinese Christianity is far remote from 
the centre of power and so far has largely abstained from political activism (Lian Xi 2010: 242). 
Moreover, even a success of a Christianity, large parts of which have “shown a greater tendency 
to absorb, and be absorbed by, popular religion rather than replace it” (ibid.), would not mean 
necessary a better understanding on a world scale. The cultural dynamics of Christianity in China 
and the West might work against as well as towards global harmony. 
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